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C O N F I D E N T I A L KUWAIT 004683

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/FO, NEA/NGA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/13/2013

TAGS: [PREL](#) [PARM](#) [KNNP](#) [IR](#) [KU](#) [IAEA](#)

SUBJECT: (C) IRAN: GOK PESSIMISTIC, BUT REMAINS ENGAGED

REF: KUWAIT 4078 (NOTAL)

Classified By: AMB. RICHARD H. JONES; REASON 1.5 (B,D)

11. (C) SUMMARY: The GOK sees no short-term hope that Iranian reformists will be able to challenge the conservative mullahs effectively, but intends to remain engaged with Tehran. It claims to have told Iran the international community is united on the need for it to comply with IAEA conditions. END SUMMARY.

12. (C) NEA PDAS Larocco called on Shaykh Sabah al-Khalid al-Hamad al-Sabah, Chairman of Kuwait's National Security Bureau, October 13, during a brief visit to Kuwait. This message reports what Shaykh Sabah al-Khalid (protect throughout) had to say about Iran (other topics septels).

13. (C) Sabah al-Khalid related that Iranian FM Kharrazi had made a quick visit here September 8 at his own request, to meet with Prime Minister Shaykh Sabah al-Ahmed al-Jaber al-Sabah in advance of an IAEA Board of Governors meeting chaired by Kuwait's Ambassador Nabila al-Mulla. Kharrazi had warned that unless al-Mulla steered the IAEA meeting in the right direction, the bilateral relationship would be affected significantly. The Prime Minister shot back that as Chair, al-Mulla was in no position to exert such influence; she had to reflect the will of the members, which was clear: Iran must comply with IAEA conditions.

14. (C) The Prime Minister went on that it was unthinkable for Kuwait to condone Iranian development of nuclear weapons or other WMD. Kuwait was relieved that the Iraqi threat had been removed; Iran should be too. Now it was Iran's turn. Kuwait as a small, weak country was committed to a region free of WMD. Iran should recognize this as a natural position. The GOK wanted to continue its excellent relations with Iran, and hoped that Kharrazi would take this message back. But Sabah al-Ahmed wanted to be clear: it appeared to Kuwait that the international community was united that Iran should comply with the IAEA.

15. (C) Sabah al-Khalid told PDAS Larocco that Kuwaiti-Iranian relations continued to be excellent despite the threat conveyed by Kharrazi. The GOK was seriously concerned, even pessimistic, however: 60% or more of Iranians who had been aggressively pro-reform were now dispirited and dormant. The GOK saw no hope in the short-term that reformists would be able to challenge the conservative mullahs effectively, because the reformers have no one to turn to.

16. (U) Ambassador Larocco was the source of this message, but did not have time to clear the cable itself.

17. (U) Baghdad minimize considered.  
JONES